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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Case No. 20170498-CA
Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.
REYNALDO THOMAS MARTINEZ,
Defendant/Appellant

MR. MARTINEZ’S REPLY BRIEF

INTRODUCTION
Mr. Martinez relies on his opening brief for the statement of the issues, the
statement of the case, and the statement of the facts. He otherwise replies to the State’s
brief as follows.
ARGUMENT
A.

COUNSEL’S PERFORMANCE WAS DEFICIENT, AND SUCH
DEFICIENCIES PREJUDICED THE DEFENSE

The State attempted to minimize or discount defense counsel’s ineffectiveness in
not instructing the jury with the required Long eyewitness identification jury instruction
and in not obtaining an expert witness as denoted by our supreme court in Clopten. See
State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986); State v. Clopten, 2009 UT 84, 223 P.3d 1103.
Contrary to the State’s claim, it was not reasonable for an attorney to disregard the long-1-

standing need to properly instruct the jury (pursuant to the Long instruction and/or
through expert witness testimony) about the fallibility of eyewitness identification,
particularly in a case where I.D. was the key issue. As the district court observed, “This
is an identification case, as everyone seems to have acknowledged and argued.” R.1111.
The record or lack of record unequivocally established that defense counsel did
not include the Long instruction and there was no expert witness to teach the jury about
the “deficiencies inherent in eyewitness identification.” Both omissions by counsel or the
lost opportunities to educate the jury with either one (or both) of such necessary
cautionary teachings cannot be deemed to have been reasonable. State v. Lujan, 2015 UT
App 199, ¶ 10 (citing Long, 721 P.2d at 488 (“The Utah Supreme Court indicated that
such clarification was necessary because ‘the scientific literature . . . “is replete with
empirical studies documenting the unreliability of eyewitness identification”’”)).
In Long, the Court accepted the invitation to “either abandon any pretext of
requiring a cautionary eyewitness instruction or make the requirement
meaningful” by deciding “to follow the latter course.” [Long, 721 P.2d] at 487.
The Court did this by “abandon[ing its] discretionary approach to cautionary jury
instructions and direct[ing] that in cases tried from th[at] date forward, trial
courts shall give such an instruction whenever eyewitness identification is a
central issue in a case and such an instruction is requested by the defense.” Id. at
492.
Then, after [State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991)], the Court
considered another aspect of cases involving eyewitness identifications—expert
testimony. In State v. Butterfield, 2001 UT 59, 27 P.3d 1133, the Court affirmed
a trial court’s exclusion of an expert witness because the trial court had found
that the proposed expert testimony “did not deal with the specific facts from
[that] case but rather would constitute a lecture to the jury about how it should
judge the evidence.” Id. ¶ 44 (internal quotation marks omitted). The issue was
-2-

revisited in State v. Hubbard, 2002 UT 45, ¶ 14, 48 P.3d 953. In Hubbard, while
leaving Butterfield untouched, the Court did invite trial courts “to specifically
tailor instructions other than those offered in Long that address the deficiencies
inherent in eyewitness identification.” Id. ¶ 20.
But in State v. Clopten, 2009 UT 84, 223 P.3d 1103, the Court . . .
announc[ed] “that the testimony of a qualified expert regarding factors that have
been shown to contribute to inaccurate eyewitness identifications should be
admitted whenever it meets the requirements of rule 702 of the Utah Rules of
Evidence.” Id. The Court “expect[ed] this application of rule 702 [to] result in
the liberal and routine admission of eyewitness expert testimony.” Id.
State v. Lujan, 2015 UT App 199, ¶ 10 n.1 (cited in Appellant’s Opening Brief, pp 25-27)
Even a cursory glance at case law would have led counsel to the unmistakable
rule (since 1986) that “trial courts shall give such an instruction whenever eyewitness
identification is a central issue in a case. . . .” State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 492 (Utah
1986). All counsel had to do was request one. See MUJI 2d, CR404 (a pre-made stock
MUJI jury instruction, entitled, “Eyewitnesses Identification [Long instruction],” was
already created in response to the 1986 Long opinion).
Counsel’s failure to research or to prepare on such a fundamental matter that was
critical to the I.D. defense at trial was not reasonable. Cf. Hinton v. Alabama, 134 S. Ct.
1081 (2014) (per curiam) (“[a]n attorney’s ignorance of a point of law that is fundamental
to his case combined with his failure to perform basic research on that point is a
quintessential example of unreasonable performance”); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510
(2003) (“‘strategic choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable’
only to the extent that ‘reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on
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investigation.’”); State’s brief, page 16 n.11 (in contrast to the State’s claim that more
proof was needed on appeal regarding what an expert witness would have said, this Court
reversed the defendant’s conviction in Lujan, 2015 UT App 199, without such an expert
proffer, and the Utah Supreme Court’s reversal in Clopten, 2009 UT 84, similarly did not
require such evidence by an expert; instead, existing precedent and guidelines were relied
upon – which trial counsel failed to do in the case at bar).
The State notes that counsel’s performance should be viewed “on the basis of the
law in effect at the time of trial.” State’ brief, page 14. As the cited authorities in the
indented quotation above make clear, Long and Clopten (and other law) were in effect at
the time of Reynaldo Martinez’s trial and for many years beforehand. See Ramirez, 817
P.2d at 778 (The prosecution bears the burden of demonstrating the admissibility of
eyewitness identification evidence. To satisfy this burden, the prosecution must “lay a
foundation upon which the trial court can make any necessary preliminary factual
findings and reach any necessary legal conclusions.” Then, the trial court must act “as
gatekeeper” and “carefully scrutinize” the evidence for constitutional defects before
admitting or excluding the evidence from the jury). The proposed rule, Utah R. Evid. 617,
may not have been then in effect, albeit the content from the proposed rule did not ignore
such existing appellate authority and Dep’t of Justice guidelines.
In an analogous context, the Supreme Court indicated that prevailing
professional norms should not be ignored and counsel may act unreasonably by not
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adhering to such professional guidelines. Prior to Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 4235
(2010), ABA Standards suggested that clients should be told about the risk of deportation
following a conviction (for certain offenses), although such professional norms in the
context of deportation lacked the force of Utah appellate law on the “deficiencies inherent
in eyewitness identification.” Just as it was unreasonable for Mr. Padilla’s counsel to not
then advise his client regarding the risk of deportation (vis-a-vis the less authoritative
ABA guidelines), it was unreasonable in Mr. Martinez’s case to not act as an advocate by
properly educating the jury with a proper eyewitness identification instruction and/or an
expert witness (vis-a-vis governing Utah appellate authority).
The first prong [of Strickland]–constitutional deficiency–is necessarily linked to
the practices and expectations of the legal community,” described in Strickland
as “prevailing professional norms.” While ABA standards and the like “are
‘only guides,’ and not ‘inexorable commands,’ these standards may be valuable
measures of the prevailing professional norms of effective representation,
especially as these standards have been adapted to deal with the intersection of
modern criminal prosecutions and immigration law.” Here, the Court cited the
ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, NLADA standards, and others in finding,
with some qualification, that “[t]he weight of prevailing professional norms
supports the view that counsel must advise her client regarding the risk of
deportation.”
. . . But when the deportation consequence is truly clear, as it was in this case,
the duty to give correct advice is equally clear. In addressing whether there is a
distinction between giving bad advice and no advice, the Court found “no
relevant difference ‘between an act of commission and an act of omission’ in this
context.”
Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 4235 (2010); cf. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688—689
(“Prevailing norms of practice as reflected in American Bar Association standards and the
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like … are guides to determining what is reasonable”); cf. Utah R. Crim. P. 11 (although
the rule governing plea bargains does not contain a subsection on deportation, an
attorney’s failure to so advise would be an ineffective act of omission under Padilla).
The deficient performance prong was established. State v. Lujan, 2015 UT App
199, ¶16 (“We agree with Defendant that the State bears the burden of convincing us that
the improperly admitted eyewitness identifications were harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt”); Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967) (“[B]efore a federal
constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”).
Defense counsel’s inescapable duty was to prepare diligently for trial. And
preparation includes investigation. “If counsel does not adequately investigate the
underlying facts of a case, including the availability of prospective defense witnesses,
counsel’s performance cannot fall within the ‘wide range of reasonable professional
assistance.’” State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 188, ¶11 (Utah 1990) (quoting Strickland,
466 U.S. at 686); accord Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003) (ineffectiveness applies
if the “failure to investigate thoroughly resulted from inattention, not reasoned strategic
judgment”); cf. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 415 (2000) (O’Connor, J., concurring)
(noting counsel’s duty to conduct the “requisite, diligent” investigation into his client’s
background).
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The State’s contentions in its attempt to justify what may or may not have
occurred below is inappropriate prosecutorial second-guessing. Cf. Wiggins v. Smith, 539
U.S. 510 (2003) (“the ‘strategic decision’ the state courts and respondents all invoke to
justify counsel’s limited pursuit of mitigating evidence resembles more a post-hoc
rationalization of counsel’s conduct than an accurate description of their deliberations
prior to sentencing”).
In regards to the prejudice prong, the State claims that there was “overwhelming
evidence of Martinez’s guilt”, State’s brief, pages 2-3, yet it acknowledges that, “Before
trial, no witness had identified Martinez as the suspect.” State’s brief, page 2. With no
eyewitness identification of Martinez as the suspect, the evidence cannot be considered
overwhelming. Rather, defense counsel didn’t do their job during trial.
Going from no witness identification to purported “overwhelming” evidence
occurred because defense counsel was not prepared for trial. Not investigating or not
preparing is not a reasonable tactical decision. Cf. Hinton v. Alabama, 134 S. Ct. 1081
(2014) (per curiam) (“[a]n attorney’s ignorance of a point of law that is fundamental to
his case combined with his failure to perform basic research on that point is a
quintessential example of unreasonable performance”).
The State’s brief outlined many of the pitfalls or evidentiary weaknesses relating
to uncertain or belated identifications:
Pre-trial identification attempts. Police showed photo line-ups—which
included Martinez’s picture—to two witnesses: Barnes’s neighbor Troy, and
-7-

Clay, who had witnessed the traffic accident. R1037. Troy identified another
man in the lineup as the robber. R1038. Clay did not identify anyone in the
lineup, but went back and forth between Martinez’s picture and another
picture, trying (unsuccessfully) to settle on one. R1040.
State’s brief, page 10. A witness’ misidentification of a man in the lineup and another
witness’ unselected hesitation over a lineup picture is not overwhelming evidence. An
additional witness had passed away prior to trial.
The only in-court identification that came from an actual eyewitness was
made by Mindy Sipes, after she had already expressed to law enforcement that she did not
think she could identify the man if she saw him again. R.1014, 62.
The other in court identifications came from Detective Hill, R.945, and Nathan
Evans, R.894, neither of whom observed the crimes charged and both of whom were
identifying the defendant to connect his name to the person sitting in the courtroom at
trial – the only non-lawyer seated at counsel’s table. See Appellant’s Opening Brief, page
36 (“Detective Hill was able to skirt well-established principles of photo lineups by
suggesting that Clay had identified Defendant when he had not. Cf. State v. Mecham,
2000 UT App 247, ¶ 9, 9 P.3d 777 (mentioning that a police investigation “appeared to be
at a dead end” when a “photo lineup . . . failed to produce a positive identification”)).
Defense counsel failed to object to the lack of foundation for the admission of
the pictures from Harmon’s. A lack of advocacy may not be considered reasonable,
where objective evidence ran contrary to the trial judge’s ruling, “I [the court] would note
that they [Harmon’s pictures] are not being offered with any time and date.” R.619. The
-8-

court’s ruling was plainly erroneous and evident by the imprints on the Exhibits
themselves and due to counsel’s lack of objection. Foundation was not established for the
claimed identification and the Harmon’s pictures did in fact have a time and/or date.
The parties also agreed that the car belonged to Jacob “Stevey” Manzanares, yet
for reasons unknown Mr. Manzanares’ fingerprints were not found inside his car. Such a
“fact” was problematic for the State in terms of the reliability of the claimed fingerprint
evidence. The gun evidence (bb gun vs a real gun) did not synch or match to the one used
in the robbery.
Moreover, the parties did not dispute that Erika Vigil and Reynaldo Martinez
knew Mr. Manzanares, and Manzanares did not allege that Reynaldo stole the car.
Indeed, the fact that Manzanares, Vigil, and Martinez were friends explains that hanging
out together in the past may have included getting into a car together (e.g. fingerprints
may have been from prior friendship encounters unconnected in time to the incident
alleged at trial) and/or it would not have been unusual for a passenger to leave innocuous
items like a baseball cap in the car (e.g. the cap containing Martinez’ DNA was knocked
out of the car by Joey in his haste to flee the scene).
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An officer may not have believed1 Erika Vigil’s explanation (which in and of
itself was improper police vouching for the jurors, see footnote 1, but it is the jury’s
determination or their ability to properly consider and weigh the flaws inherent in
eyewitness identification that counted.
This appeal does not address the insufficiency of the evidence. Rather, the
eyewitness evidence was not overwhelming and an expert identification witness and/or
the Long jury instruction (in accordance with governing law) should have been a pre-trial
gate-keeping determination that precluded their admissibility from trial and/or to caution
the jury (via the expert witness or Long instruction) about why or how such identification
testimony may “get better” during the heat of trial. Lujan, 2015 UT App 199, ¶ 11, 357
P.3d 20 (citing Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 783 regarding cautionary identification instruction
concerning “whether the witness’s identification was made spontaneously and remained

1

When an expert undertakes to tell the jury what result to reach, this does not
aid the jury in making a decision, but rather attempts to substitute the
expert's judgment for the jury's. When this occurs, the expert acts outside
of his limited role of providing the groundwork in the form of an opinion to
enable the jury to make its own informed determination. In evaluating the
admissibility of expert testimony, this Court requires the exclusion of
testimony which states a legal conclusion. . . . we were particularly
concerned that the witness repeatedly tracked the exact language of the
statutes and regulations which the defendant had allegedly violated and
used judicially defined terms such as "manipulation," "scheme to defraud"
and "fraud" in opining on the defendant's conduct.

United States v. Duncan, 42 F.3d 97 (2nd Cir. 1994); Mukhtar v. California State
University, 299 F.3d 1053, 1065 (9th Cir. 2002).
-10-

consistent thereafter or whether it was a product of suggestion [and] includes considering
the length of time that passed between the witness’s observations at the time of the event
and the identification of the defendant, the witness’s mental capacity and state of mind at
the time of the identification, the witness’s exposure to information from other sources,
instance when the witness failed to identify the defendant, instances when the witness
gave descriptions that were inconsistent with the defendant, and the circumstances under
which the defendant was presented to the witness for identification”).
In Lujan, the sufficiency of the evidence was not the issue. Enough evidence
existed for the robbery suspect with a black beanie to be linked with Mr. Lujan, who was
also found with a black beanie. The suspect was Hispanic; Mr. Lujan was Hispanic and
found hiding inside an air conditioning unit. Other factors collectively pointed to Mr.
Lujan as being the appropriately identified suspect, yet this Court reversed. “Because we
determine that the trial court erroneously admitted unreliable eyewitness testimony, we
reverse and remand for a new trial.” Lujan, 2015 UT App 199, ¶ 1. The same result is
required in Mr. Martinez’s case. Defense counsel failed to provide the Long eyewitness
identification jury instruction, a minimal long-standing case law requirement. Counsel
similarly failed to call an expert witness to educate the jury on such identification pitfalls.
“[S]uch clarification was necessary because ‘the scientific literature . . . “is replete with
empirical studies documenting the unreliability of eyewitness identification.”’” State v.
Lujan, 2015 UT App 199, ¶ 10 (citing Long, 721 P.2d at 488).
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CONCLUSION
Prior counsel performed deficiently and prejudicially. The ineffective assistance
of counsel standards were met. Mr. Martinez asks this Court for a new trial.
DATED this 4th day of June, 2019
/s/ Ron Fujino
Attorney for Mr. Martinez
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